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ACCOUNTING FOR THE WHOLE:
WHY PANTHEISM IS ON A METAPHYSICAL
PAR WITH COMPLEX THEISM
Caleb Cohoe

Pantheists are often accused of lacking a sufficient account of the unity of the
cosmos and its supposed priority over its many parts. I argue that complex theists, those who think that God has ontologically distinct parts or attributes, face
the same problems. Current proposals for the metaphysics of complex theism
do not offer any greater unity or ontological independence than pantheism,
since they are modeled on priority monism. I then discuss whether the formal distinction of John Duns Scotus offers a way forward for complex theists.
I show that only those classical theists who affirm divine simplicity are better
off with respect to aseity and unity than pantheists. Only proponents of divine
simplicity can fairly claim to have found a fully independent ultimate being.

1. Introduction: Aseity and Unity
What, if anything, does it take to account for what we see around us?
Classical theists insist that only a transcendent entity can provide sufficient metaphysical grounding for reality. To explain why things exist, we
need to find a ground of being that is more fundamental than familiar
material objects, such as humans and horses, or their material parts, such
as atoms and subatomic particles. We even need to go beyond the universe as a whole. Pantheists, by contrast, think that the cosmos itself could
be the ultimate being or at least the entity that grounds and explains the
manifold appearances around us.1
1
Pantheists can be counted as theists insofar as they believe in God (while identifying
God and cosmos). Classical theists, as I use that term, are those who hold that there is a cause
or ultimate being (i.e. God) which is metaphysically ultimate and which transcends the cosmos and cannot be identified with it. This paper focuses on the question of metaphysical or
ontological ultimacy. This sort of ultimacy is related to but distinct from axiological ultimacy
(being the best or most valuable) and soteriological ultimacy (being the source of salvation,
meaning, and fulfillment). Some such as J. L. Schellenberg insist that an ultimate being must
fulfill all these roles (The Will to Imagine). While I am open to such a position, this paper
does not assume anything about the axiological or soteriological status of the metaphysically
ultimate being, since that lies outside its scope. It does not make claims about what sorts of
axiological or soteriological ultimacy classical theism in particular requires.
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Classical theists typically employ some version of a cosmological argument to argue for an ultimate transcendent being. They maintain that an
independent, necessarily existing divine being grounds and explains the
universe in a way that the cosmos itself cannot.2 The universe and the
things in it are too contingent to be the stopping points of metaphysical
explanation. Only a transcendent God can meet the conditions of aseity
and unity necessary to be ultimate. Of course, for this sort of argument to
succeed, the transcendent being must not need metaphysical explanation
in the way that ordinary concrete objects and the universe itself do. In this
paper, I lay out the requirements that aseity and unity place on ultimacy.
I then use these requirements to argue that only classical theists who affirm
divine simplicity are better off with respect to aseity and unity than pantheists. If we endorse aseity and unity as constraints on ultimacy, we are
pushed to acknowledge that the ultimate is entirely simple.3 Complex theists, those who think that God has ontologically distinct parts or attributes,
are on a metaphysical par with pantheists when it comes to the explanatory and ontological priority of their supposed ultimate being.4 Current
proposals for the metaphysics of complex theism do not offer any greater
unity or ontological independence than pantheism, since they are modeled
on a priority monism that is congenial to pantheists. Thus pantheists offer
a strong challenge to classical theists: either embrace divine simplicity or
2
Recent discussions of this sort of cosmological and foundational reasoning include Pruss,
The Principle of Sufficient Reason; Pearce, “Foundational Grounding”; Almeida, Cosmological
Arguments; Hamri, “On the Ultimate Ground of Being”; Bohn, “Divine Foundationalism.”
3
There is a further issue here: are we entitled to assume that the simple divine being must
be transcendent (i.e., entirely distinct from us and entities in the world), or does this require
argument? There are versions of monism, such as Advaita Vedanta Hinduism, that affirm a
strong version of ontological simplicity but also hold an identity between the ultimate simple
divine being and other entities that might seem to be distinct, such as the individual soul. We
see this in Adi Shankara’s insistence that the divine, simple, and immutable Ātman is one
and the same within various seemingly distinct things (Vedãnta Explained, I.1.11), without
change or loss of unity (II.2.35) and while also being the same as the individual soul (II.3.17).
Cf. the relationship between the individual soul, the world soul, and Nous for Plotinus or
issues about the One in Parmenides (e.g. Palmer, “Parmenides”). This issue would require
another paper, so I will not address it here, though for an argument that the ultimate principle cannot in any way enter into relations of composition with other things, see Aquinas,
Summa Theologiae, Ia Q. 3 A. 8.
4
It is important to note that many Christian theologians affirm absolute divine simplicity
while also affirming the doctrine of the Trinity. Theologians in the early Christian, medieval,
and modern eras usually worked to show how this doctrine is compatible with simplicity, rather than opting for complex theism. For example, Augustine says (de Trin. VII 1.2)
that God is “absolutely simple” (summe simplex), a view Thomas Aquinas strongly defends
(e.g. Summa Theologiae Ia Q. 3 A. 2–8). The Westminster Confession holds that God is “without parts” and “immutable” (ch. 2.1). Things are somewhat more complex for the Eastern
fathers, but they definitely take themselves to be affirming divine simplicity, albeit perhaps
with more qualifications, e.g., Basil of Caeserea, Against Eunomius, II 29. For more on these
complications, see Radde-Gallwitz, Basil of Caeserea, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Transformation
of Divine Simplicity, chapters 4, 6–7, and conclusion. Obviously, the doctrine that God is three
persons raises issues for divine simplicity, but I will not be considering them in this paper.
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accept that pantheism and theism are on a metaphysical par when it comes
to explanatory and ontological priority. Only proponents of divine simplicity can properly claim to have found a fully independent ultimate being.
To evaluate whether the cosmos or some other non-transcendent entity can
serve as an ultimate being instead of a transcendent divine being, we need to
know more about the constraints on serving as a ground for being or being
ultimate. Two constraints are central to this question: aseity and unity. Aseity
(from the Latin a se “from itself”) means that something has being or exists in
virtue of itself and not in virtue of some other, further being. An ultimate being
or a ground of being cannot, by definition, be dependent on some other entity
for its being. If supposed ultimate being A were ontologically dependent on B,
A would not, after all, be the ground of being, since B is grounding its existence. B would also be more ultimate than A, precisely insofar as it grounds A.
The ultimate being must also have a sufficient degree of unity. An unrelated collection of ontologically separate things, C, D, E, could not be the
ultimate being. A bundle or heap of properties is not a suitable candidate
for the ultimate being because a heap or bundle needs some further explanation for why its constituents are what they are.5 The bundle itself does not
need to have the constituents or properties that it does. Instead there is an
external explanation for what accounts for those constituents being present in that way. For example, one bundle of sticks is composed of a certain
number of sticks and has a certain shape because of the way the sticks were
collected by an agent (say, for kindling) while a bunch of sticks on the seashore have the number and arrangement that they do because of the interaction between the tide and the beach. In bundle cases, there is some further
external thing beyond the bundle that accounts for the composition of the
bundle, whether an agent or some sort of force. But any sort of ontological
dependence or causal dependence on some further thing that united C, D,
and E would mean that the supposed ultimate being was not ultimate. So
the ultimate being can neither be a mere collection of things nor any sort of
unified whole that depends on something external for its unity.
This means that on some metaphysical views there will be nothing that
counts as an ultimate being. If the universe is a Humean collection of successive beings with correlations between them but no deeper or ultimate
explanation for the whole, then there will be nothing that counts as an ultimate being. In a Humean universe, although there is nothing beyond the
universe that causes or explains it, the universe itself does not count as an
ultimate being because it lacks the sort of unity something needs to count
as a substance or real being.6 The universe is just one thing after another;
5
I am holding fixed that all three constituents are necessary for the ultimate being. If one
of them, C say, were the ground of everything else, then D and E would be otiose.
6
I am thus taking the conditions for ontological ultimacy to be stronger than those for
being ontologically fundamental. At least on some views, fundamentality can be relative.
Even in a Humean universe, some entities (e.g., the elements of physics) might be more
fundamental than others and thus they would be candidates for what “the fundamental entities” refer to in such a universe. By contrast, in a Humean universe, there is nothing unified
and ontologically independent enough to meet the conditions for ultimacy.
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it is not some unified whole composed out of its parts. All the explanatory
work is done by connections between individual things, not by the universe itself. Because of this, such a universe could not fulfill the role of an
ultimate being. To be a candidate for an ultimate being, something must
have sufficient unity as well as meet the aseity condition.
2. Metaphysical Issues for Pantheism
Can a pantheist cosmos satisfy aseity and unity? To answer this question, we need to say more about what pantheism is. This is a challenging
task, given the great variety of views that go under this name. Andrei
Buckareff and Yujin Nagasawa take a straightforward approach in their
recent introduction to a collection of papers on pantheism and panentheism, defining pantheism as the view that “God is identical with the universe.”7 This approach makes it clear that pantheists deny transcendence:
God or any part of God is not outside or distinct from the universe. But
it leaves underspecified what view of God, if any, is required to count as
a pantheist. Is taking the universe to be the ultimate substance enough to
be a pantheist or must the universe also be seen as having various traditional divine attributes, such as goodness, knowledge, causal power, etc.?
For the purposes of this paper, I will take pantheists to be committed to
denying divine transcendence.8 I will also take them to be committed to
thinking that the universe forms an ordered whole which counts as an
ultimate being and satisfies aseity and unity.
What is required in order for the universe to do this? Here pantheists
differ. Some take a more minimal approach. On such views, the cosmos
forms an ordered whole that has priority over its parts, but it is not itself
an entity with knowledge or moral goodness. It may contain order and
mind because its parts are panpsychic or proto-conscious, not because the
cosmos itself is a mind.9 On other versions of pantheism, the cosmos itself
has a mind or a world-soul. 10 This divine force, which is itself good and
rational, organizes and orders the whole universe. These two approaches
have different strategies for establishing the unity and order of the cosmos. On the first type, order and mind arise from features present in the
material parts themselves. On the second type, by contrast, there is a
fundamentally intellectual or psychic principle involved in ordering the
Buckareff and Nagasawa, “Guest Editorial Preface,” 2.
My article will leave aside panentheist views, according to which, as Buckareff and
Nagasawa put it, “the universe is an aspect of God, where this may include taking the universe to constitute or bear some other relation besides identity to God” (“Guest Editorial
Preface,” 2). If complex theism turns out to be on a par with pantheism then a fortiori it will
be on a metaphysical par with panentheism.
9
Goff, “Did the Universe Design Itself?” offers one defense of such a view.
10
Proponents of such views include the Stoics, and their divine embodied Logos, but also
eclectic thinkers influenced by both Stoics and Platonists, such as Marcus Terrentio Varro,
who, according to Augustine, identified God with the soul of the cosmos (civ. Dei VII.6; cf.
VII. 9–10, 29–30). A contemporary example of this sort of position is found in Leslie, “What
God Might Be.”
7
8
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matter of the universe. I will return below to the metaphysical advantages
and disadvantages of these two types, but for now, we can start with the
challenges common to both types.
The complexity of the universe may seem, on its own, to rule out aseity
and unity. Indeed, pantheism has been attacked by theists for being unable
to meet these conditions. How could a being with manifold parts be the ultimate being, the metaphysical first principle of reality? With respect to aseity,
the cosmos seems ontologically dependent in several ways. To begin with, on
some views, the identity of the universe depends on the identity of its parts.
Without the particular features of the space-time continuum that obtain (e.g.,
without the particles or fields or whichever other entities constitute it), the
cosmos would not be what it is. Even if, however, its identity is not contingent on having the particular parts it does, it is still the case that the universe
would not be what it is without some parts. Even if the parts that constitute
it are changing, it is still always true that without any of these parts the universe itself would not be. In this way, it seems to be ontologically dependent
on something outside itself. The being of the universe seems to be contingent
either on its parts or on some external cause that explains its existence.
Serious worries also arise with respect to unity. If the ultimate being has
parts, then we need an explanation for why the cosmos has these parts and
is one unified entity (as opposed to something like a heap). This explanation would seemingly have to come from something further, not from the
cosmos or its parts. Many have doubted whether the cosmos is or could be
an internally unified whole: it either lacks unity or is unified by something
external to it. There are some metaphysical views, such as unrestricted
composition, which would allow for all the things in the universe to compose another further thing.11 However, many hold that stronger conditions are required for metaphysical composition. Why think that all the
entities in the universe compose a unified whole? Further, even if there is
a sort of unity to the cosmos, it might not be the strong sort of substantial
and formal unity. To be ultimate, the universe needs to be the sort of whole
that can serve as the fundamental ground for all other beings.
3. Pantheist Responses
There are various pantheist responses to these worries. Jonathan Schaffer
insists that “according to common sense, the cosmos is prior to its many
proper parts” since the various possible divisions of the whole cosmos
into parts seem arbitrary and non-fundamental, whereas the whole is not
arbitrary.12 Schaffer offers additional metaphysical arguments in favor of
11
Proponents of unrestricted composition or universalism, the view that, for any objects,
there is a single object that is composed of those objects, include Leśniewski, “Foundations
of the General Theory of Sets”; Goodman and Quine, “Steps Towards a Constructive
Nominalism”; Lewis, Parts of Classes; Rea, “In Defense of Mereological Universalism”; and
Baker, The Metaphysics of Everyday Life, 191–193.
12
Schaffer, “Monism,” 49.
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such a view. One of his key arguments is based on what he calls the asymmetry of supervenience:
The asymmetry is that the proper parts must supervene on their whole, but
the whole need not supervene on its proper parts. In other words, though
emergence is metaphysically possible, submergence—the converse of emergence—is metaphysically impossible.13

While facts about the parts sometimes fix facts about the whole (if the parts
of the table are flammable, the whole table will be as well), strong emergence, where the whole has properties that do not supervene on its parts,
is widely taken to be possible (even by those who do not think it actually
obtains). By contrast, if you hold the whole fixed, everything about its
parts will be fixed as well. There can be no “submergent” properties, as
Schaffer puts it, that are underivable from truths about the whole. Any
candidate for such a property (Fness say) would be a property of a certain
part, G. But G is, by definition, part of the whole, so that what the whole
is involves having G as a part. But to be such a part, to be G, is to have
this property of Fness, which means that Fness is included in the whole.
Given this asymmetry of supervenience, a priority monism grounded in
the whole has an advantage over part-first ontologies.
There are also various responses pantheists can make to account for the
unity and contingency of the universe. Some pantheist views appeal to
panpsychism to explain the fine-tuning, unity, and order of the universe.14
Others suggest that the goodness of the cosmos might itself explain why
the cosmos must be as it is.15 Some, such as Baruch Spinoza, claim that, in
fact, everything that happens in the universe is necessary.16 Contingency
is only apparent. These strategies have various advantages and disadvantages and not all are mutually compatible. This paper cannot definitively
evaluate the prospects for all of them. Instead, its goal is to compare the
general pantheist metaphysical strategy with the strategies used by theists. All these pantheist responses to worries about unity and aseity make
use of the idea that a whole can be prior to its parts and ultimate even if
it depends in some way on its parts. The cosmos may need its parts and
their order to be what it is, but this does not undermine its status as the
unified ultimate being.
How does this sort of response compare with the metaphysical strategies used by theists? If pantheists” accounts are successfully developed,
how will the pantheist cosmos fare on aseity and unity? Answering this
depends on whether metaphysical alternatives fare better with respect to
Schaffer, “Monism,” 56.
E.g., Goff, “Did the Universe Design Itself?”
15
E.g., Leslie, “What God Might Be.”
16
“In nature there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from the
necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way” (Spinoza, Ethics
Ip29); “things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other order than
they have been produced” (Spinoza, Ethics, Ip33).
13
14
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aseity and unity. If alternative metaphysical views provide stronger candidates for a being with ultimate ontological and explanatory priority,
then they possess an advantage over pantheism with respect to ultimacy.
If, however, alternative metaphysical views on the ultimate face similar
problems with aseity and unity, then pantheism is no worse off than its
competitors in terms of these conditions.17
4. Simple Theism and Strong Aseity
Our goal is to examine how pantheism stands on these questions relative
to theistic views. Here we need to bring in the distinction between simple
theists, who hold that the ultimate principle is entirely simple, having no
ontologically distinct parts or attributes, and complex theists, who deny
this. While simple theists are better off with respect to aseity and unity
than pantheists, complex theists face similar challenges.
Let us start with simple theism. This view endorses the following
principle:
Absolute Ontological Independence: The ultimate being cannot, in any
way, depend for its being on anything distinct from itself.
This principle is interpreted by the classical theist tradition as ruling
out any internal parts or ontologically distinct properties in the ultimate
being. Figures such as Plotinus, Augustine, Ibn-Sīnā [Avicenna], Anselm
of Canterbury, Moses Maimonides, and Thomas Aquinas use this idea
of aseity to insist on absolute divine simplicity.18 Any distinct parts or
properties would contribute to making the ultimate what it is, making
the ultimate dependent in some way, and violating aseity.19 Further, since
the ultimate being is entirely simple, no question of unity arises, since
there are no distinct parts, properties, or attributes to unify. Simple theism
entirely satisfies the conditions of aseity and unity.20
17
For the purposes of this article, I am setting aside epistemic issues about how probable it is
that we live in a pantheist cosmos as opposed to a created universe (or various other options).
While these questions are vital for an overall evaluation of pantheism, theism, and naturalism,
evaluating them would require careful consideration of a number of complex issues, from the
evidence for panpsychism to the status of natural laws and the nature of modality. Instead of
examining all these details, this article will look at the structure of the resulting worldviews.
If the pantheist model can be successfully worked out, what status will the pantheist cosmos
have with respect to aseity and unity when compared to the simple theist and complex theist?
18
Plotinus, Enneads, V.4.1.5–15, VI.8, 8.14–16, 14.35–42, VI.9, 6.13–30; Augustine, De Trinitate,
6.7.8; Ibn-Sīnā [Avicenna] Metaphysics, book I, chapter 7; Anselm, Proslogion, 18; Maimonides,
Guide, ch. 50; Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia 3.7. As noted above, for classical Christian thinkers there are complications here related to the Trinity. However, it is important to note thinkers
such as Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas insist that the Trinity does not compromise absolute
simplicity and endorse full-fledged divine simplicity. As my focus is comparing the respective
metaphysics of pantheism and theism, this paper sets aside these Christian theological issues.
19
See Cohoe, “Why the One Cannot Have Parts” for further elaboration and discussion
of this claim.
20
For an overview of the traditional connection between simplicity and aseity see Brower,
“Simplicity and Aseity.”
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In pagan, Jewish, Islamic, and Christian contexts, simple theism was the
dominant view during classical antiquity and throughout the medieval
period. However, many contemporary theists reject simplicity due to concerns
about its coherence21 and what they take to be its theological implications.22
For our purposes, we need only note that simple theism is in good shape with
respect to the conditions of aseity and unity, as long as its coherence can be
defended, something a number of recent thinkers have done ably.23
5. Complex Theism and Weak Aseity
This leaves complex theists, those who deny absolute simplicity.
Proponents of this sort of view endorse the claim that there is an ultimate
transcendent being, but also hold that this being has multiple, ontologically distinct parts or properties.24
As R. T. Mullins puts it, such theists
reject divine simplicity and opt for divine unity. God’s attributes are not
identical to each other. Instead, God’s essential attributes are distinct and
coextensive. God’s wisdom is not identical to His power, but one will not
find God’s wisdom floating free from His power.25

How does complex theism fare with respect to aseity and unity?
Complex theists by and large recognize aseity and unity as conditions
that the ultimate being needs to meet and seek to show that a complex
divine being would meet these conditions. However, since they think
that the divine being has parts or properties that are distinct from God,
even if necessarily co-existent, they cannot endorse Absolute Ontological
Independence. Instead, they must endorse a weaker version of aseity framed
in terms of external dependence. Mullins, for example, insists that “the
doctrine of divine aseity says that God’s existence and essential nature do
not depend upon anything outside of God.”26 Things that are “completely
distinct” from God must depend on God and God must not depend on
anything that is “completely distinct” from God. We can formulate this
weaker independence principle as follows:
Qualified Ontological Independence: The ultimate being cannot, in any
way, depend for its being on anything completely distinct from itself.
E.g., Plantinga, Does God have a Nature?; Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God.
E.g., Mullins, “Simply Impossible.” For worries about coherence, see Plantinga, Does
God have a Nature? and Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God; for worries about simplicity’s
theological implications see Mullins, “Simply Impossible.”
23
Defenses include Bergman and Brower, “A Theistic Argument Against Platonism”;
Brower, “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity”; Stump, “The Nature of a Simple God”; Jacobs,
“The Ineffable, Inconceivable, and Incomprehensible God”; Cohoe, “Why the One Cannot
Have Parts”; Schärtl, “Divine Simplicity.”
24
The claim that the ultimate being is transcendent and thus not the same as the universe
is, of course, the key feature that separates complex theists from pantheists.
25
Mullins, “The Difficulty with Demarcating Panentheism,” 331.
26
Mullins, “Simply Impossible,” 192, italics added.
21
22
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This allows for God to have ontologically distinct parts while still preserving aseity. As long as everything outside of God depends on God and God
depends on nothing outside God, aseity is satisfied, regardless of which
ontological dependence relations obtain within the divine being.
We should be suspicious of this move. There are surely some internal
ontological relations that would rule out aseity. If the divine being turned
out to ontologically depend on the divine attributes while they did not
depend on the divine being, this would certainly call the supposed aseity
of the divine being into question.
Thomas Morris tries to motivate distinct conditions for ontological relations internal and external to God by suggesting that dependence relations involving God are different from those only involving creatures. He
insists that the criteria for ontological dependence relations between created objects are fundamentally different from those that obtain between
God and created objects:
on any ontology in which everything distinct from God depends on him for
its existence, composition and complexity relations into which God enters
will be importantly different from composition and complexity relations
holding among created objects. Asymmetrical ontological dependence relations obtaining among the latter will not hold in the same way among the
former.27

So, everything distinct from God is asymmetrically ontologically dependent on God, since each thing outside God relies on God for its being, but
things might be different within God. Morris claims that even if:
there is any substantive sense in which God depends on his properties, it
will also be true that his properties depend, and depend in a deeper ontological sense, on him. Thus God will never be on the receiving end only, so
to speak, of an ontological dependence relation.28

Morris thinks (contra Anselm, as he notes) that as long as the divine properties also depend on God, aseity is preserved and God will still count as an
independent being, even if God depends on the divine attributes in some
sense. Morris holds that aseity is satisfied as long as, for any candidate
independent being I, there is no distinct being on which it depends and
there is no being, property, or attribute on which I asymmetrically depends.
Humans, horses, and hadrons are not independent beings because they
asymmetrically depend on the distinct divine being. A complex divine
being, however, can be independent because such a being’s dependence
on its parts is symmetric: parts and whole both depend on each other.
6. Pantheism Satisfies Weak Aseity
Now Anselm himself raises a challenge for Morris: a supposedly ultimate
being with parts “is not fully one but is in some way many and different
27
28

Morris, “Dependence and Divine Simplicity,” 170.
Morris, “Dependence and Divine Simplicity,” 171.
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from itself.”29 Such a being could not be ultimate because it “is able to be
divided either actually or conceptually.”30 Since its parts are different from
the whole, we can evaluate them separately insofar as they are distinct
from each other, at least conceptually, and then either the whole or the
parts must be lesser than the other. But this would mean that the ultimate being either is or has parts than which something greater can be
conceived, so it is not ultimate. We can conceive of a being that is entirely
ultimate without any lesser parts and this being is greater than a being
some of whose parts are not the greatest or best. Thus, even if this supposedly ultimate being were in fact unable to be divided from its properties,
the fact that it is conceptually divisible would still make it lesser than a
being that is entirely one and indivisible. This pressures the complex theists to either abandon perfect being theology or hold that simple theism
turns out to be contradictory, too good to be true.
Even if, however, complex theists are successful in defending Qualified
Ontological Independence as the appropriate standard, they will still be unable to claim an advantage over other metaphysical views. What Morris
says about God could be said just as easily about the cosmos by a pantheist. If the ultimate being is the cosmos itself, of which everything else
is a part, then the cosmos counts as an a se being, since there is nothing
completely distinct from it on which it depends (since everything that exists
is part of it). Moreover, everything outside of it can be said to depend on it:
a condition trivially satisfied, since there is nothing outside of it.
We can see this clearly in the characterization of aseity provided by
Yann Schmitt:
(1′) Necessarily, for any x, if x is God, x creates and maintains in
existence whatever is not identical with x or a part of x.31
Substituting in the Ultimate or the Cosmos for God illustrates how this
condition is in danger of being trivially satisfied by pantheist views:
(1″) Necessarily, for any x, if x is the Ultimate/the Cosmos, x creates or
maintains in existence whatever is not identical with x or a part of x.
If everything is either identical with or a part of the cosmos, then this
condition seems to be met. There is nothing outside of the cosmos which
the cosmos does not create or maintain, since on such metaphysical views
there is nothing outside of it at all. The cosmos itself counts as a se.
7. Only Strong Aseity Can Distinguish Theism from Pantheism
This suggests there is a problem with only requiring an ultimate being to
be independent from external entities: it allows for aseity to be trivially
satisfied by claiming that everything is internal to the candidate entity.
“non est omnino unum, sed quodam modo plura et diversum a seipso” (Proslogion, 18).
“vel actu vel intellectu dissolvi potest” (Proslogion, 18).
31
Schmitt, “The Deadlock of Absolute Divine Simplicity,” 125.
29
30
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This makes aseity too easy to meet. The obvious response is to extend
the requirement of ontological independence to all entities and their internal parts. Once we do this, however, we are back to Absolute Ontological
Independence, a condition neither a pantheistic universe nor a God with
metaphysical parts can meet. Only the entirely simple being of classical
theism would be a suitable candidate for the ultimate being.
Now we could add in a condition relating to the dependence of the
parts on the whole:
(1‴) Necessarily, for any x, if x is the Ultimate/the Cosmos, x creates
or maintains in existence whatever is not identical with x or a part of
x and any part of x ontologically depends on x to be what it is.
This requires that candidates for ultimate being ground their parts. Their parts
are what they are because of the whole. This move, however, is not one that
will distinguish complex theism from pantheism. On both views, the ultimate
being has parts or properties which it requires, even if these parts or properties
are also ontologically dependent on the whole. Complex theists cannot require
a stronger sort of dependence, such as creation, as God could not create God’s
own parts without circular ontological dependence, as I will show below. The
weaker version of dependence of parts on wholes is one that pantheists also
affirm. So pantheists can maintain this weaker view of aseity just as much as
complex theists. Either we endorse a strong version of aseity, which neither
complex theism nor pantheism meets, or a weak version, which both meet.
8. The Unity of Complex Theism and the Unity of Pantheism
We see this result again when it comes to the question of unity. Is a complex
divine being sufficiently unified to be a candidate for the ultimate being?
Would such a being be more unified than the cosmos? For any strategy the
complex theist adopts to explain the unity of God, the pantheist can adopt
a parallel strategy for the unity of the cosmos.
We see this in Gregory Fowler’s recent defense of complex theism,
based on the priority of the whole. The idea is that in certain unified structure the whole is explanatorily and ontologically prior to its parts. For
example, the parts of the body have their status as parts because of the
whole. Without the whole system in which they fit, the hand would not
really be a hand nor the eye an eye. Gregory Fowler uses this notion to
formulate a complex theism that he thinks can still respect the necessary
metaphysical constraints. Fowler advocates for the following view:
The Doctrine of Divine Priority (DDP): For all x, if x is a proper part of God or
x is a property of God, then x depends on God for its existence.32

Fowler presents this as an alternative to divine simplicity. If the whole can
be ontologically prior to its parts, then theists can preserve aseity without
endorsing absolute simplicity.
32

Fowler, “Simplicity or Priority?”
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But if this is true for the theist, it is also true for the pantheist. On
standard versions of pantheism, everything that exists is a part of the
divine whole, meaning that this whole only has relations of ontological
and explanatory dependence with its parts and not with anything external.33 Indeed, Fowler specifically models his priority relation on Schaffer’s
priority monism. Thus, a unified whole, such as the pantheist or priority monist cosmos, could have ontological priority over all of its parts in
the same way that the complex theist’s divine being has priority over its
parts. Both wholes can claim to make the parts what they are, while also
depending on these parts for their continued persistence. The pantheist is
no worse off than the complex theist when it comes to unity.
Another recent defense of complex theism also suggests that they are
on a par. Matthew Baddorf claims that we can conceive of God’s relation to God’s properties as the relation which the bearer of tropes has to
the tropes. While there are bidirectional counterfactual dependence relations between tropes and their bearers (if this trope did not exist, then
this bearer would not exist and vice versa), the bearer is ontologically
prior to the tropes themselves.34 This means that God must ground God’s
tropes. To argue that God is more fundamental than God’s tropes, Baddorf
makes a similar appeal to the priority of the whole, particularly the living
whole over its parts, as defended by figures such as Aristotle, Hegel, and
Schaffer.35 But again, this is exactly the sort of move that the pantheist can
make just as well.
Pantheist attempts to make sense of the unity of the cosmos might also
be relevant to complex theism. Bauer, for example, has argued for what he
calls a Directed Unity view, on which the many causal powers in the universe are all interrelated and intentionally directed towards one another.
For a power to be what it is, there needs to be other appropriate powers
to which it can be related, acting and being acted upon, so that “all properties (powers) form an interconnected web, meaning that no property
is causally isolated from the others.”36 Complex theists certainly should
not want to hold that various divine powers or properties are unrelated
to one another, so the idea of a web of powers with mutual entailments
may be useful. On this view of powers holism, “the functions of all the
powers in a system are ontologically interdependent. As such, the powers
that make up the system are capable of affecting each other: when one
undergoes a change, the system is appropriately affected.”37 This could
help the complex theist address concerns about whether various divine
powers are separable from one another and whether they are necessarily
See Schaffer, “The Least Discerning and Most Promiscuous Truthmaker” and “Monism.”
Baddorf, “Divine Simplicity,” 407–409.
35
Baddorf, “Divine Simplicity,” 412; cf. the Divine Truthmaker Complexity of Saenz,
“Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity.”
36
Bauer, “Powers and the Pantheistic Problem of Unity.”
37
Bauer, “Powers and the Pantheistic Problem of Unity.”
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coordinated. It would, however, again leave the complex theist using the
same strategies as the pantheist.
We can say, then, that the most promising recent approaches for the
complex theist to maintain the unity of the ultimate being are parallel to
the pantheist’s. Such theists are in no better a position than pantheists. If
the ultimate entity is a one-many—one substance with many ontologically
distinct properties (tropes, modes, properties, etc.)—then a pantheistic
universe can meet these requirements just as well. The distinct classical
theistic move of insisting on a one beyond the many is lost. Only divine
simplicity can claim such an ontological advantage over pantheistic rivals.
9. Complex Theism, Pantheism, and Necessity
Now you might object that, on complex theism, God is a necessary being,
giving God a better claim than the cosmos for being ultimate. Here again,
however, many versions of pantheism hold that the cosmos is necessary
in some sense.38 Also, many of the conceptions of divine necessity put forward by complex theists are vulnerable to parity challenges. For example,
Thomas Morris insists that God, as the creator of everything creatable, creates God’s own haecceity or nature (making the nature causally dependent on God) but also that God’s haecceity is logically sufficient for God’s
existence (making God logically dependent on his nature). Morris recognizes that this suggests that God is creating himself and attempts to avoid
this by insisting that while each of these relations is always transitive,
transitivity may not hold across both of them together.39 But this is highly
implausible. A being whose nature is necessary cannot have parts that it
creates, as then it would both depend on these parts (since they are necessary and make it what it is) and these parts would depend on it (insofar
as these parts are created). Morris’s proposal seems incoherent. Even if it
were defensible, it would be vulnerable to parity arguments. If reciprocal
ontological dependence is not circular and needs no further explanation
or grounding, Morris’s view can be parodied by the pantheist or cosmic
naturalist. The divine cosmos too could both make the parts that compose
it while also depending on them.40 If Morris’s proposal were to turn out to
be coherent, a self-making divine cosmos would be as well.
10. Can the Formal Distinction Distinguish Complex Theism from Pantheism?
There is one other recent approach in the literature that might be able to
distinguish the unity and aseity of a complex and transcendent divine
being from that of the cosmos. Yann Schmitt advocates for what he calls
“absolute indivisibility,” adopting a version of the more moderate simplicity advocated by John Duns Scotus. Scotus holds that the divine attributes
E.g. Spinoza Ethics, Ip29 and Ip33; Leslie, “What God Might Be.”
Morris, Anselmian Explorations, 176.
40
Especially on pantheist views on which there is a guiding mind or soul to do the making.
38
39
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are distinct from each another, but insists that they are so formally but
not in reality. God and God’s attributes are ontologically inseparable. This
requires employing the formal distinction of Duns Scotus, which has three
conditions:
X is formally distinct from Y if and only if (1) X and Y are inseparable even
for an omnipotent being, (2) X and Y do not have the same definition, (3) the
distinction between X and Y exists de re.41

Jeff Steele and Thomas Williams describe the view of Scotus as unitive
containment. Scotus thinks that God and God’s attributes are formally
distinct, as this is necessary in order for there to be a union, but that
they are also not distinct things in re. Scotus insists that this union is not
a “composition or aggregation of distinct things” as such a composition
would, he concedes, violate aseity and unity.42 Still, I agree with Steele and
Williams that Scotus is, in fact, rejecting divine simplicity. As they note:
What Scotus calls simplicity involves mind-independent plurality—complexity, even if not (on Scotus’s stipulative understanding of the word) composition—in God: precisely what his predecessors ruled out in the name of
divine simplicity.43

Now, does the formal distinction give the complex theist a plausible
account of the unity of God with God’s attributes that the pantheist
cannot use?
The answer to this question depends, of course, on whether Scotus’s
formal distinction is itself plausible.44 We need to accept that the formal
distinction reflects a de re metaphysical distinction, even though X and
Y are inseparable even for an omnipotent being. This raises a number of
metaphysical issues. How do we assess and evaluate when a distinction
between X and Y is de re, despite their inseparability? Which sorts of metaphysical views can affirm this sort of formal distinction?
For now, however, let us assume that we can accept Scotus’s formal
distinction. The formal distinction, on its own, is not enough to vindicate
the complex theist. The formal distinction has to apply to God and God’s
attributes, while being too strict to apply to the cosmos and its parts. Are
the divine attributes formally distinct but ontologically inseparable in a
way that the attributes of the cosmos are not? If so, a complex divine being
would be unified in a way that the cosmos cannot be allowing for a greater
degree of simplicity and unity.
Now many of the features of the cosmos seem separable from one
another by an omnipotent being, failing to meet condition (1) of the formal
41
Following the reformulation of Schmitt, “The Deadlock of Absolute Divine
Simplicity,” 129.
42
Ordinatio IV, d. 46, q. 3, n. 74, trans. Steele and Williams. For discussion see Steele and
Williams, “Complexity without Composition,” 622–625.
43
Steele and Williams, “Complexity without Composition,” 631.
44
As Steele and Williams note, “Complexity without Composition,” 630.

216

Faith and Philosophy

distinction. Any version of pantheism that takes the cosmos to be composed of multiple distinct substances could not use the formal distinction. However, there are ways pantheists could deny this. If one endorses
Bauer’s version of powers holism, it is natural to think that powers are
essentially individuated by the powers system they partly constitute. This
could allow one to maintain that the cosmos, too, satisfies condition (1).
This power is inseparable in being from what it is in this Directed Unity
of powers that constitutes the cosmos. Since powers are essentially interdefined, they cannot be ontologically separated from their corresponding
powers, even by an omnipotent being. The cosmos and its parts do meet
conditions (2) and (3) about distinctness, so if condition (1) were met, the
cosmos would be a candidate for unitive containment. This points to an
area where more work is needed by advocates of pantheism. How distinct
is the cosmos from its parts on their views?
There are also a number of issues that need to be resolved to show how the
God of complex theism could satisfy these three conditions. First of all, the
components of the formal distinction rule out many omni-being approaches
which involve the best overall balance between various divine attributes. If
maximum omnipotence is separable from maximum goodness (and possibly incompossible with it), then such a being would not satisfy condition (1)
of the formal distinction. Considerable work needs to be done to show which
divine perfections (and which degrees—the maximal ones?) are absolutely
inseparable, that is, inseparable even for an omnipotent being.45
Further, we would need distinct arguments for the inseparability of
each and every divine attribute. Perfect being arguments that it would be
better to have an attribute than not to have it would not be enough. Even
if the best possible being would be both perfectly wise and perfectly loving this is not enough to show that “being perfectly wise” is logically and
metaphysically inseparable from “being perfectly loving.” The approach
of Scotus sets a very high bar to meet.
Finally, the formal distinction may just be too stringent for most complex theists. It leaves us with a divine being all of whose attributes necessarily imply the others, with no features that could be separated from
the divine being in any possible world. Such restrictions seem incompatible with many of the motivations that complex theists appeal to, such as
allowing for a contingent and changing divine will or giving us a divine
being that exists and changes in time.46 Appealing to the formal distinction
45
The complexities of discussing these omniproperties, much less proving their necessary
co-instantiation can be seen through examining the recent literature e.g., Rogers, Perfect Being
Theology; Nagasawa, “A New Defence of Anselmian Theism” and “Models of Anselmian
Theism”; Oppy, “Perfection, Near-Perfection, Maximality, and Anselmian Theism”; Bohn,
“Anselmian Theism and Indefinitely Extensible Perfection”; Todd, “The Greatest Possible
Being Needn’t Be Anything Impossible.”
46
E.g., Mullins, “Simply Impossible”; though Steele and Williams “Complexity without Composition,” section 3, shows the relevance of Scotus’s denial of simplicity to his
voluntarist ethics.
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may be the best option for a complex theist to metaphysically differentiate their position from pantheism, as it requires a level of unity and aseity that a pantheist cosmos may not be able to meet, while still falling
short of absolute simplicity. Nevertheless, this metaphysical option does
not seem open to most contemporary advocates of complex theism, given
their other metaphysical and theological commitments. Versions of complex theism that do not go the Scotist route will remain on a metaphysical
par with pantheism.
11. Conclusion
While pantheists are often accused of lacking a sufficient account of the
unity of the cosmos and its supposed priority over its many parts, we have
seen that pantheists have a powerful challenge for their theist critics: either
give a satisfactory account of divine simplicity or accept that theism and
pantheism are in the same sort of metaphysical position when it comes to
explanatory and ontological priority. Current proposals for the metaphysics of complex theism do not offer any greater unity or ontological independence than pantheism, since they are modeled on priority monism. The
best option for the complex theist may be reviving the formal distinction of
Duns Scotus, but this requires considerable further metaphysical defense
and may not be a live option for many complex theists, given their other
commitments. To complex theist critiques of the unity and independence
of the pantheist cosmos, pantheists can justly respond: tu quoque.
Only classical theists who affirm divine simplicity are better off with
respect to aseity and unity than pantheists, since an absolutely simple first
principle does not depend in any way on the being of something else and,
having no parts, is in need of no explanation of its unity. If we endorse aseity and unity as constraints on ultimacy, we are pushed to acknowledge
that the ultimate is entirely simple. Perhaps only proponents of divine
simplicity can properly claim to have discovered and acknowledged a
fully independent ultimate being.47
Metropolitan State University of Denver
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